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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040134-CA
v.
KEVIN R. BLANKE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
kidnapping, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Should this Court reject defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim where defendant has not provided this Court with an adequate
record to support it?
No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions are attached at Addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. VI;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information dated September 5, 2002, with one count of
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302
(Supp. 1996) (R. 2-3). On October 17, 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the four-year statute of limitations had run (R. 25-53). On February 3, 2003, the trial
court denied defendant's motion (R. 77-78). Seven months later, defendant entered into a
plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to an amended information charging
him with kidnapping, a second degree felony (R. 86-93). Defendant entered his plea on
September 12, 2003 (R. 86-93).
On November 6, 2003, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and duress (R. 100-01). After appointing new
counsel and holding a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 106; 116-18;
R. 146:passim). Defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison, to run
consecutive to a sentence he was already serving (R. 111-12).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 122, 124, 128).
STATMENT OF FACTS 1
On December 30, 1997, defendant met Jennifer Boone and her girlfriend at a
Circle K convenience store in West Valley City. Defendant drove them to a nearby
business, where he parked his truck (R. 3). Jennifer's friend soon left (R. 3). When
1

Because no preliminary hearing or trial was held in this matter, the statement of
facts concerning the crime are taken from the probable cause statement attached to the
information (R. 3).
2

Jennifer also left, defendant followed her, gave her a note telling her that she had to
"comply with my commands," told her that she had to get into his truck because he had a
gun, and pushed her inside his truck (R. 3). Defendant then drove Jennifer to an unknown
location, where he raped and sodomized her (R. 3).
On September 10, 2002, defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping (R.
2-3). On October 17, 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the fouryear statute of limitations had run on his crime (R. 25-53). On February 4, 2003, after
argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 77-78).
Seven months later, on September 12, 2003, defendant entered into a plea
agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to an amended information charging him
with the lesser crime of kidnapping (R. 86-93; R. 140:passim). At the plea hearing,
defendant stated that he was voluntarily entering his plea, and acknowledged the various
constitutional rights he was waiving by entering his plea (R. 140:4-9). During the plea
colloquy, defense counsel noted that defendant had earlier indicated that he "had quite a
headache going," and counsel "wanted to see whether, physically, Mr. Blanke is okay"
(R. 140:8). Based on counsel's statements, the trial court made the following inquiry:
Court:

All right. That would be important, Mr. Blanke. Do
you feel that your headache or any other ailment might impair
your ability to think clearly this morning?

Defendant:

No, your Honor.

Court:

And feel like you'd like to go forward?

Defendant:

Yes.
3

Court:

You don't feel like you have any problem in that regard?

Defendant:

No.

(R. 140:8-9) (emphasis added). The following dialogue then took place concerning the
trial court's statute of limitations ruling:
Court:

If you plead guilty today, Mr. Blanke, you're giving up
your right to challenge that, right to appeal; in other words,
once you plead guilty today, you'll no longer be able to—to
argue that the statute of limitations has run, that the State
can't prosecute you. Do you understand that?

Defendant:

Yes.

Court:

Are you willing to give up the right to file that appeal
or to make that challenge?

Defendant:

Yes, your Honor.

(R. 140:9-10). The trial court then accepted defendant's plea (R. 140:10).
Before sentencing, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea on two
grounds. First, defendant claimed that counsel at his plea hearing ("plea counsel") had
rendered ineffective assistance by providing him misinformation about DNA evidence
against him and telling him that he could appeal the trial court's statute of limitations
ruling even if he entered a guilty plea (R. 100-01). Second, defendant claimed that he
was under duress when he entered his plea due to physical pain caused by osteoarthritis
(R. 100-01). In light of defendant's motion, new counsel ("motion counsel") was
appointed (R. 106, 108).

4

A hearing was held on defendant's motion on January 7, 2004 (R. 146). At the
beginning of the hearing, motion counsel indicated: "I talked to my client's prior counsel
and have reviewed his motions and have been talking to him back there. So, I think it's
in his best interests to pursue this today, at least with oral argument before the Court on
the motion" (R. 146:3) (emphasis added).
The majority of the hearing addressed whether defendant's motion was timely (R.
146:passim). In the course of that discussion, defendant's motion counsel indicated that
defendant had "a copy of an affidavit of facts" concerning his claims which "are issues
that would be brought to this Court's attention if this Court finds that the motion to
withdraw the plea . . . [is] timely" (R. 146:9, 11). Counsel also proffered that, in fact,
defendant had received discovery concerning the DNA evidence before he had entered his
plea, but that he did not have time before the plea to completely review that discovery (R.
146:14). Finally, counsel referred to a letter that defendant's plea counsel had written to
defendant. The letter, dated after defendant had entered his plea, indicated that if
defendant wanted to appeal the trial court's statute of limitations ruling, defendant would
have to first move to withdraw his plea (R. 146:29). Motion counsel did not have either
defendant's affidavit or prior counsel's letter admitted as exhibits (R. 146:passim).
Motion counsel did not call any witnesses (R. 146:passim).
The trial court denied defendant's motion, concluding:
The defendant has failed to present any evidence or proof that his
defense attorney, Mr. Peterson, had 'duped' him or that his plea was
involuntary. It is the defendant's burden to show good cause why his
5

plea should be withdrawn and the defendant has wholly failed to
provide any proof for the allegations and grounds made in his
motion.
(R. 116-18).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his motion counsel provided ineffective assistance because
she did not present any evidence in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The
record, however, does not contain any of the evidence defendant claims should have been
presented, let alone establish that he was prejudiced by its lack of presentation.
Defendant's claim thus fails.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM WHERE DEFENDANT HAS
NOT PROVIDED THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD
TO SUPPORT IT
Defendant claims that his counsel on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea "was
ineffective for failing to present any evidence regarding his original defense counsel's
misrepresentations regarding his ability to appeal the plea and misrepresentations
regarding DNA evidence" where "these misrepresentations caused his plea to be not
knowing and voluntary." Aplt. Br. at 6-7. Specifically, defendant claims that his motion
counsel "fail[ed] to admit [his] affidavit to the trial court" and "failed to place [him] on
the stand to testify." Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant claims that "[e]ither action would have

6

presented the trial court with sufficient evidence to conclude that Blanke's plea was
unknowing and involuntary." Aplt. Br. at 9.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show
both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see
also Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
In considering whether counsel performed deficiently, there is "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v.
Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah App. 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 19, 12 P.3d 92. Because counsel is
given "wide latitude in making tactical decisions," courts "will not question such
decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d
638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also State v. Clark, 2004
UT 25, If 6, 89 P.3d 162. "[T]his [Cjourt will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." State v.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
In addition, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
7

the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Thus, in addition to showing counsel's
deficient performance, defendant must also demonstrate that"'there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.'" Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). To establish such prejudice in the context of a guilty plea,
defendant must show '"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or she]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Dean,
2004 UT 63,122, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah
1994) (brackets in original; additional citation omitted).
Finally, "where, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective .. ., defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate."
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 16. Thus, "[i]f a defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could
support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App. P. 23B, defendant
bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand." Id. "The
necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will presume that any
argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of
which defendant is aware." Id. at lj 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor
of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.; see also State v. Bradley, 2002 UT
App348,H65,57P.3dll39.
8

Here, defendant claims that his motion counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
not submitting his affidavit at the motion hearing or calling him as a witness at that
hearing. See Aplt. Br. at 9. Neither the affidavit nor his testimony, however, are part of
the record on appeal. Moreover, defendant has made no attempt under Rule 23B to make
them so. See Utah R. App. P. 23B (providing for remand to allow defendant to develop
record supporting ineffective assistance claim if initial record on appeal is inadequate);
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 16 (holding "defendant bears the primary obligation and
burden of moving for a temporary remand" under rule 23B).
Thus, defendant's assertion that "[e]ither action would have presented the trial
court with sufficient evidence to conclude that Blanke's plea was unknowing and
involuntary," Aplt. Br. at 9, is completely lacking in record support. Under Litherland,
this Court must construe that deficiency "in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17. This Court may easily do so in this case.
First, the transcript of defendant's plea hearing clearly establishes that he was not
suffering from any physical pain when he entered his plea (R. 140:8-9). It also
establishes that defendant clearly understood he was waiving his right to appeal his
statute of limitations claim by entering his plea, which suggests that his plea counsel did
not advise him that he could still appeal that issue (R. 140:9-10). Thus, defendant's
motion to withdraw on those two bases was without merit, and counsel was not deficient
in failing to pursue them. See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295,^j 22, 55 P.3d 1147
(stating that "'failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
9

raised does not constitute ineffective assistance'" (citation omitted)).
Defendant's only remaining claim was that his plea counsel misinformed him
about the state of the DNA evidence (R. 100-01). At the motion to withdraw hearing,
defendant's motion counsel stated that she had addressed defendant's motion with his
plea counsel (R. 146:3). Thus, defendant's motion counsel knew what plea counsel's
testimony would likely be if he were called as a witness. Motion counsel also noted that
defendant's plea counsel was in the courtroom (R. 146:3). Thus, she knew that plea
counsel was available to be called by the State to counter any evidence defendant might
present.
Given these facts, defendant's motion counsel apparently decided that the chances
of defendant's motion being granted were better absent presentation of evidence than they
were having defendant's plea counsel called as a witness. On this record, defendant
cannot show that his counsel's decision was deficient. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465
("[T]his [C]ourt will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices,
however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect."); Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 17
("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively.").
Finally, even if defendant's counsel did perform deficiently, defendant has not
established that he was prejudiced by that error. Defendant has provided no legal
authority to support his underlying claim that a defendant's failure to review discovery
10

which he received before his plea constitutes good cause to withdraw that plea. See Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellant to support appellate claims with citation to legal
authority). Thus, even if motion counsel had presented the evidence defendant now
claims she should have, defendant has not shown that the trial court would have granted
his withdrawal motion.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2J4_ November 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

U.S. Const. Amend. VI

[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

Utah Const. Art. I, § 12

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

